By admin 
The war against Iran, launched earlier this year by the United States and Israel, has caused a spike in energy prices around the world, and this strain on the global economy was exacerbated by Iran shutting down the Strait of Hormuz in March. Recently, however, the amount of oil passing through the strait every day has climbed back up to ten million barrels, according to some estimates. (Before the war, the figure was at least sixteen million barrels per day.) This increase has led some analysts to suggest that America and its allies have managed to overcome Iran’s greatest leverage point in the conflict. But this, in turn, has led to another concern: that Iran will, in desperation, begin attacking other energy targets in the region.
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I recently spoke by phone with Sanam Vakil, who directs the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the British think tank Chatham House. She is also a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether the United States has actually found a lasting solution to Iran’s attempts to slow down commerce in the strait, whether higher oil prices really matter to the White House, and why a return to a larger conflict remains overwhelmingly likely.
When you think about the status of the conflict between Iran and the United States today, does it feel like a stalemate, or does it feel more like a race against time, where one side is bleeding out and trying to survive as long as it can?
I do think we are in a stalemate. If you think that both sides assess the circumstances in the same way, you might not understand the logic of the stalemate analysis. But, as someone who’s followed and worked on Iran for quite some time, it’s a stalemate to me, because both sides are very much backed into their corners. The U.S. narrative is that time is on its side, in part because the blockade is certainly impacting the economic climate in Iran in an obviously negative way. Certainly, the Trump Administration has gone above and beyond what previous U.S. Administrations have done, not just in terms of the blockade but in enforcing sanctions and compliance, particularly among Iranian allies.
But what Trump Administration officials are missing is that they’re trying to approach the strangulation of Iran in the same way that they would approach the strangulation of the United States or another Western country. And they are not factoring in how existential this war is for the Islamic Republic and its leadership, and not factoring in that the leadership does not have a track record of making good decisions under pressure, or because of factors such as declining growth, or currency devaluations, or inflation. They make decisions based on security, stability, and survival. And because the conflict is so consequential for the survival of this Islamic Republic, and for the individuals inside this Islamic Republic, they are not necessarily going to respond the way the Trump Administration would expect. Yes, there is economic pain, which is hard for the Iranian people, but the regime will manage to endure until the negotiating terms are more favorable. What they won’t do is bend the knee to Donald Trump. That’s just not in the world view and ideology of this group of people in charge. And so, from their perspective, it is a stalemate.
They do want a deal, and they want a way out. But you’re not seeing them compromise in any sort of way. They’re trying to shape the conflict environment, and perhaps stave off another round of war, but they’re also preparing for another round of full-on war, which is also what the Trump Administration is doing.
Do you think the Islamic Republic made a mistake when it broke the terms of the memorandum of understanding that was reached earlier this summer? Because, at the time, most analysts said that deal was embarrassing for Trump, and that he had caved by offering a deal that had some similarities to the Obama nuclear deal. Or was the sense in Iran that Trump and the Israelis would never have stuck to the deal?
My view is that it was probably the best deal that Iran had on the table compared to any deal in previous years, and perhaps the best they would get going forward as well. I don’t think they are ever going to get such an arrangement again. But the Iranian system isn’t monolithic and is factionalized, and I think the Trump Administration doesn’t appreciate or understand the nature of that factionalism within the system. There are key decision-makers that are so deeply distrustful of Trump and the Israelis that they saw such a good deal as the beginning of further pressure, and they saw American efforts to set up a shipping lane on the Omani side as a suggestion of American efforts to weaken the deal. So that world view and that thinking are very much formed by decades of watching the U.S., and decades of learning from experience that the U.S. doesn’t stick to its plans, particularly with Iran. They see the American agenda toward Iran as akin to the way the U.S. dealt with the Soviet Union, where they saw that America ultimately wanted the Soviet Union to unravel.
Right, presumably there needs to be some sort of deal at some point, which requires some amount of trust, but at the same time it’s hard to blame the Iranian regime for feeling that the Trump Administration and the Israeli government are completely untrustworthy.
In terms of the Iranian security establishment, this is also about regime preservation. They feel very burned by all of the times that they have compromised—whether it’s the two times when they were negotiating with the Trump Administration and then were subsequently bombed, or when Trump, during his first term, ended the Obama nuclear deal. But, at the same time, these individuals are, of course, hostage to their own world view. And, by never being able to move beyond it, that world view becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
To return to this stalemate question: I had assumed that elevated oil prices would work in Iran’s favor and put pressure on the United States, and perhaps its allies, to wrap this up and make a deal. But the Trump Administration seems to just not really care about the politics, even with an election five weeks away. Does that then make Iran’s situation more difficult?
Well, that’s of course what’s interesting. The Iranians also thought that if they could amp up the pressure, amp up the prices, particularly around the midterms, that they would have an impact, and that has been very much their game and their gamble. But they, too, have been surprised that Trump seems unmoved by these dynamics and assumptions. I think about how he presented this conflict at the start. He is someone who is so obsessed with himself and his legacy that maybe he’s willing to take the pain, absorb the cost, and continue fighting until he can achieve something he sees as historic, perhaps a deal of some kind.
Earlier, you said that Iran isn’t thinking about this as a Western country would. And I assume what you meant by that is Iran isn’t thinking about this the way that a country with democratic feedback loops would.
Yes.
Maybe that’s also the case here in America now, though–that the normal democratic feedback loops have just sort of broken down, or Trump simply doesn’t care about them.
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Yes, and it’s possible he does not consult the wider bureaucracy or intelligence agencies in the way that past Presidents would have traditionally done. It seems as if there is no consultation with the community of experts that would have cautioned, advised, and warned. And, certainly, if you look at the polling and the sentiment of the American people, the vast majority are against this war. But what I think is lacking is that Trump has not made a consistent case for why this war is necessary, and what the United States is trying to achieve. And I don’t think it’s about opening the Strait of Hormuz. So, what does the U.S. want out of this? And how does the U.S. walk away?
Let me ask you, then, about the American efforts to open up the strait more. There’s been some dispute about how much of the strait is actually open to oil tankers. What do you know about the current situation?
I think the United States is playing a role in creating safe passage—whatever that looks like—for a lot of ships to get through. There is also what’s taking place off the books—illicitly, however you want to look at it—where ships turn off their radar and are making side deals with the Iranians to get through. So I don’t think that there’s one story. I think that there are a couple of concentric explanations for what’s going on. What isn’t clear to me, though, is exactly who’s making deals with whom? There are all sorts of rumors about some Gulf countries having arrangements with the Iranians, and this could be one domain where that exists.
Secondly, if so many ships are moving through the strait, formally or informally, certainly there is some Iranian fuel that is also moving. And then, thirdly, Iran still has disruptive capability. Control over Hormuz doesn’t mean Iran is the traffic warden on the bridge; it just means they are able to disrupt things, and they can keep disrupting things going forward in ways that will still be damaging.
And there’s a sense that they could ramp up that disruption even more if they felt as if they were losing the leverage, correct?
Well, I think we have to look at the region as a broader ecosystem. There may be a logic to why they’re lowering the temperature on disruption right now, and it could be for two reasons. One, there is active diplomacy under way, led by the Qataris and Omanis, and there are several different proposals out there about sequencing a series of maneuvers and measures, in order to get back to more formal nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. And then, second, there is the Houthi variable. We’re not back in active military conflict, and so the Iranians have wanted to showcase their disruptive capability. But I don’t think they want to disrupt or close two choke points simultaneously. At least not yet. Because they don’t want to invite or trigger the return of military conflict.
What can you tell us about the Houthi part of this?
Over the past few weeks, Yemeni government forces mobilized a campaign against the Houthis, and the Houthis marshalled a more competent military response than was expected. They overturned those government forces in key areas, including the Red Sea, and this meant an internal Yemeni conflict, as well as the extension of the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, both of which have disrupted shipping on the Red Sea. And there were also strikes from Iraq, where Saudi Arabia said Iraqi militias hit the Saudi East-West Pipeline, taking it offline for a few days. But the Iranians, so far, have not become directly involved in either conflict. In my mind, Iran doesn’t want to reactivate or broaden the conflict at a moment when diplomacy is under way. I think they would be holding that back for the future.
There was some speculation and some reporting earlier in the war that the Saudis had become concerned about how aggressive the United States and Israel had become, and that the Saudis had broken with the United Arab Emirates, which was pushing for full-on regime change in Iran. It seems recently, though, that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been pushing Trump to attack the Houthis. Is this just about the importance of a shipping route in the Red Sea and the civil war in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia is involved in?
A ten-year war.
Yes, which has killed lots of people, including lots of civilians.
So, obviously, the war with Iran has been a huge challenge for Saudi Arabia, as well as all of the other Gulf states. It’s brought economic and security challenges of immense proportions not felt by this part of the world for decades, since the 2003 war and the first Gulf War, in 1990. They’re in very uncharted waters, and, while there have been very strong sentiments at the popular level in Saudi Arabia, I would also argue there is a feeling within the Saudi government that President Trump was led into this war by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu without seriously considering Gulf interests and Gulf relationships in the way that they had expected.
Over the course of the conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia, along with many other Gulf states, has worked to temper the Trump Administration’s return to military conflict: they have warned, in multiple phone calls, “If you start attacking critical infrastructure in Iran, the Iranians are going to hit us.” So they’ve played a very important role in trying to stabilize the region, and build out diplomatic channels that are in use in negotiations by the U.S. and Iran today. But what Saudi Arabia didn’t prepare for adequately was the conflict in Yemen, which was actually very predictable. I think that they overestimated the Yemeni forces, who are traditionally very divided. They also fell out with the U.A.E. last December, and the Emiratis withdrew from southern Yemen, further weakening the government forces there. So perhaps the Saudis didn’t have that intelligence picture in the way that they should have. And I would also argue that they thought time was on their side, perhaps, with the Houthis. They miscalculated the military capacity of the Houthis, and in this climate of war they didn’t want to go back to the political negotiations that they had been having with the Houthis. There was a ceasefire between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia in 2022, and there had been negotiations in the following years. But then, after October 7th, all of those negotiations somewhat froze. And effectively, since then, Saudi Arabia has been buying time, but numerous regional conflicts all just spilled out in this ugly way, and I think now they’ve been caught off guard—and President Trump has been equally frustrated with Saudi Arabia. It has been quite embarrassing to the Saudis that the U.S. government has not been materially helpful to them in this moment of crisis.
How do you see things changing or not changing after the November election?
I do not think the midterms change anything. I’m of the mindset that there will be another round of military conflict with Iran. It’s a question of whether it’s going to be going into the midterms or immediately after. And it could depend on the outcome of the election. Let’s imagine a scenario where the Democrats do swimmingly and also take the Senate: then, obviously, Trump will eventually have his hands tied on war matters. So, if he’s going to do it, he’s got to do it sooner rather than later. Maybe I’m wrong, but I would see war coming to a theatre near us, regardless.
It does also seem as if the degree to which the Americans have eased passage through the strait requires a huge military burden that costs a lot of money and takes a lot of resources.
Yeah, the longer this drags on, the costs are going to mount from an economic perspective. But I think, above all, it takes resources away from other conflicts. And this could become a protracted conflict, like the Ukraine-Russia war, and that would be an awful scenario for the region, as well as for Iran. ♦